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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

NEW FRENCH SOCIALIST POLICY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81
pp 1751-1754

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "A New Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa"]

[Text] The inauguration of a new socialist government, assured of a parliamentary majority, which intends to radically change banking and economic systems, implies new directions in French policy in Africa. We know a few of them through the statements of Francois Mitterrand and the members of his general staff: increase in the volume of assistance, without including in it the grants reserved for DOM-TOM [Ministry of Interior in Charge of Overseas Departments], different sectoral and geographic distribution, priority importance given to the problems of Southern Africa. But the details are only supplied to us by composite documents drawn up by party study groups during the presidential campaign. If they indicate trends, the circumstances under which they were drawn up and the critical analysis of the previous administration on which they are based sometimes taint them with a certain campaign quality and demand cautious consideration.

Other statements come from recently appointed ministers. Often dictated by the concern to reassure public opinion by avoiding breakdowns in the conduct of business, they are not uniformly enlightening and it even can be feared that they will only delay some changes of direction, which the situation would offer a unique opportunity to effect, while avoiding the inconvenience of having to reverse one's opinion later. In fact, electoral Manichaeism has not operated in a single direction. The previous government has responded to a smoothly systematic criticism with a defense which was nonetheless effective and which was applied in particular to the files on Chad and the Comoro Islands, not to mention Vanuatu, one of the most surprising "failures" in our long overseas history.

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Confronting Political Africa

The French, as a whole declare they are committed to a policy of assistance to the Third World, but often recoil as individuals and groups at the financial sacrifices it entails. This attitude would improve if they were better informed about the undeniable advantages which its African tradition provides France. No doubt, on the economic level, it only gets a small, if not negligible part of its raw materials from African countries, but the surplus of its trade with them reduces the deficits of its foreign accounts. "The very nature of this trade operates qualitatively in favor of our technologies, taking into account the considerable share of manufactured products which these countries buy from us.*" A community of history which has lasted more than half a century strengthens the world commercial basis of our language. Militarily speaking, Africa gives to France, because of the land bases and the overflight rights which it grants, a role which exceeds its European size. Finally, in conducting its foreign policy, the confidence of the African countries provides it with many votes in international assemblies.

In return, this situation calls for an increased effort on our part, which is not only financial, but creative, to solve the problems which Africa, and especially subsaharan Africa without oil faces. Its seriousness, not only for Africa, but for the equilibrium of the entire world, is poorly appreciated. Following a cycle of droughts which raged from 1973 to 1975, whose return was unfortunately confirmed in 1980, increasing an urbanization movement which already could not be controlled, food production there dropped considerably. It is easier to mention the African countries--Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Kenya and, to a certain extent, Mali--where it was possible to approximately maintain this production than those, almost all the others, where it has continued to decrease, forcing countries whose resources are already heavily burdened with debt because of the drop in the price of export products and the rise in the price of energy to increase their indebtedness by purchases of food products or depend on international philanthropy to exist. These countries, caught between famine and bankruptcy, the indifference or expansionism of the most favored among them, the selfishness of the industrial powers, the false solicitude of the USSR, above all concerned with assuring itself bases in the prospect of future conflicts, and the covetousness of some Maghreb countries, tend to renounce all effective administration of their territory. The world crisis is intensified there by a disappointed abandonment of the very idea of technical progress.

For economic evils, there exist remedies of the same nature, whose arsenal is far from being exhausted. We will examine later those

*The Socialist Party and Sub-Saharan Africa. See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 22 May 1981 p 1395.

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which could be suggested by the French government, to the extent of its resources and the concern not to compromise its fundamental interests. However, in the political order, we can only be skeptical about the soundness of the western initiatives.

A colonial regime which kept a fairly low ceiling on the value of the individual and which was considered contrary to his dignity by many, but which was united internally and generally assured material security through an honest and efficient administration has been followed for 20 years, from Biafra to Uganda, from Chad to Ghana and to Liberia, from the Sahara to Ethiopia and from the Comoro Islands to Equatorial Guinea, passing through Shaba, by a series of wars, coups d'etat, executions and massacres, which cannot lead anyone to glorify decolonialization. Also it seems that our political activity in Africa should have been more marked by prudence and modesty than anywhere else. Moreover our sources of information have been reduced there as our nationals left the hinterland. The maintenance of agreements according to which we guarantee the integrity of many countries against foreign threats, is certainly essential to the extent that they contribute to peace. However, on the whole, it seems that the continental policy, which assures the prevention and mediation of conflicts of all types, should be left to the OAU and the regional groups which support it.

As weak as they sometimes appear, these institutions are, in fact, the only ones which have the right, because their members will bear the consequences, of making a judgment about the viability of state structures inherited from colonialization. In a period when there are beginning in Africa, through the circulation of people and goods across frontiers, particularly African social and economic forms, avoiding the rigidity of superimposed systems and foreshadowing perhaps a new Africa, which would be made by itself, through a general redistribution of the maps, one can understand the OAU's objective in its justification of the intangibility of the colonial frontiers like frontiers inherited from the Treaty of Versailles which were formerly imposed on the SDN [expansion unknown]. But no one can foresee the moment when this position will cease to be peaceful and become a cause of war and when the Somali problem and the Ewe problem will have to be settled, among many others. It is enough that a certain disorder be tolerated to prevent more serious evils. It is not necessary that those who have created it, support this disorder in principle.

This is one of the reasons why the resumption of an effort by Giscard d'Estaing in favor of an international conference which would propose solutions for the explosive problems of the Horn of Africa, arouses a certain suspicion. One has failed to appreciate in France the almost miraculous nature of the settlement which took place in 1977 at Djibouti, facilitated as much by the circumstances as the skill of those who negotiated on the spot. It was critical enough to

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settle this matter at best in the interests of those formerly under our jurisdiction, of those in the West and of peace to avoid incurring new responsibilities in a negotiation whose conditions for success, in any case, do not seem to exist.

Specific Subjects

However, some special problems justify positive action, because they question values of a universal nature, involve a security beyond that of the continent or simply risk damaging French interests whose legitimacy is unquestionable. Such are those of South Africa, Chad, the Comoro Islands, and additionally those involving the security of navigation in the Indian Ocean.

The new minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson, has made known several times the importance which the government attaches to the rapid development of Namibia towards independence and to unequivocal opposition to South African apartheid. It is not only a humanist attitude, but a realistic evaluation of the demands of our presence in Africa. It is for this reason that the embargo on weapons destined for Pretoria is imposed, even if it must involve sacrifices for our industry and our workers, which foreign competition will not fail to take advantage of. The United Nations has approved resolutions on this matter, they put France under an obligation. They must be strictly applied.

However, it would be unfortunate to extend this attitude to the field of trade, even to that of our own defense, by decreasing our trade with these two countries to the point of its elimination. The USSR does not hesitate to purchase the wheat it needs from the capitalist West, nor to sell it the gas which will run its factories. The exports of South Africa itself to the African countries in 1980 exceeded 1,150 million rands or 7.3 billion French francs. Its customers have not asked whether the quality of the goods or foodstuffs they bought were altered by the practice of apartheid. One could not imagine, to only mention this example, that the future of the Renault car which Renault is to construct and introduce soon, in collaboration with British Leyland on the rapidly expanding RSA /Republic of South Africa/ market, will be compromised for the benefit of American or Japanese firms.

Two questions are asked regarding South African uranium (in fact Namibian): its enrichment and deliveries of the crude ore to France. The enrichment of the uranium destined for the Koeberg plant, developed by Framatome, goes through the United States and France, which must transform it into UF 6 pellets. It is known that the objections which President Carter made about this process resulted in South Africa accelerating the development of an economical enrichment process which will be operational as early as 1985. However France is committed to supplying an initial charge, drawn from its

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own stocks, as soon as the plant is put in operation. Must this commitment be broken, with the inconveniences that could involve for our own purchases of crude uranium? It seems that Claude Cheysson has answered this question in the negative on last 18 June, during the lunch of the Diplomatic Press Association.

It is, in fact, from the point of view of its restoration that the problem of our trade with the Republic of South Africa should be examined and not in the dogmatic prospect of reducing it. This restoration can only be achieved at the present time, by reducing our imports and increasing our exports, if possible both at the same time. There is no a priori reason to exclude from this realignment Namibian uranium, at the very time when the drop in prices facilitates supply from other producers. Only the opportunity to diversify our purchases could obstruct this natural solution. It is up to the government to decide it on the basis of the extent and distribution of our needs.

In Chad, it can be concluded that France faces both a problem of world strategy, connected with the unusual location of this country which commands access to our allies in Central Africa and the Sahel, and a problem of responsibility in the origin of the civil war. That of France goes back to its establishment in this country and the destruction of preexisting institutions, which then was carried out without this choice ever being denied until independence. More recently, the benevolent neutrality observed for a long time by our forces towards those of Hissene Habre has added its influence to that of this initial mistake. A state of affairs exists today in Chad which the Libyan presence makes intolerable. We must understand that every attitude which could be interpreted as favoring, directly or indirectly, a return to civil war would alienate from us sympathies, which happily are long lived. This is what Acyl Ahmat, whose complex personality hides no doubt views which are rather different from those generally credited to him, came to say in Paris. We must finally realize that a matter of this scope will not be settled easily the way we want it, which was the position of the previous government. Whatever the illusions in the political environment in Ndjamena may be, we must be present and cooperate positively there.

The regime of Ahmed Abdallah in the Comoro Islands is not illegal, or at least it is no more so than that of Ali Soilih which is succeeded since, originating like it from a coup d'etat, it has received in the same manner the approval of universal suffrage and has been recognized by most countries in the area and by all the international authorities. Besides the real creators of these two coups d'etat are the same. We can certainly desire for the archipelago a government which is more solicitous about popular aspirations and an administration which is less concerned about commercial considerations, but the initiative can only come from the Comorans themselves.

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France holds with Mayotte, whose reintegration in the Comoran national whole should be speeded up, a trump whose repercussions in local politics must be properly evaluated. The recent visit to Paris of Muzawahr, Ali Soilih's former minister leads to speculations which it would be advisable to put a stop to, since any interference, even indirect in favor of a party discredited by its brutalities and its antireligious attitude could only be disastrous. But we must not forget either the presence of 30 mercenaries at Maroni in the form of a praetorian guard, whose versatility could again be demonstrated. Financially and logistically, the interested parties, mainly French and Belgian, do not depend on France, but on a network of African countries among which we count our allies. This explains the discretion of the French police regarding their movements and their purchases. It is not very justifiable for a French military mission to stay with them on Great Comoro, thus confirming suspicions of connivance between them and our government.

The Indian Ocean zone of peace is an idea sponsored by President Ratsiraka. Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War do not create a favorable background for this objective, but the proposal to hold an international conference on this subject is worth considering. Besides, one would not imagine that Mauroy would be any less receptive to it than Barre. It would be advisable that France be invited to it as a riparian power (because of Reunion) and not as a mere user. French sovereignty in our southern department, which the inhabitants of Reunion have confirmed in many elections has been, in fact, questioned in various ways during the last 10 years, both by Tanzania as well as by Madagascar and the Seychelles, who have even made of it one of the subjects of the politico-military rapprochement planned between them. Our government has never answered these attacks, about which the public in the mother country has little or no information. This is not a reason to let an opportunity escape to put an end to it.

Regarding the mini-problem of the "scattered islands," more or less connected with the preceding, the only answer which can be made to it is that there is no justification to give to third parties what belongs to the nation and this all the more so since a transfer of sovereignty would be a formidable legal precedent because of the consequences it would involve elsewhere. On the other hand, the economic utilization of these islands could be organized for the benefit of all, under the jurisdiction of a scientific office.

Without disregarding the repercussions of the most asserted positions of principle in the conduct of our policy in Africa, the fact remains that the range within which changes of policy of a moral or legal nature can be effected is narrow, even for the subjects which have just been brought up. It is only in altering our economic policy with respect to the various African countries that more concrete results can be expected.

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On a general level, France has advocated for a long time the need for the stabilization of the prices of tropical products, without which no development effort can be satisfactorily undertaken. This was the very spirit of the system which France used with its former African colonies until the Treaty of Rome through the creation of local funds whose revenues were assured by the additional prices allowed on the products which they sold to it. Historically, it is to compensate for the risks involved by the abandonment of this system that France intervened to open up access for these countries to the European market through the first Yaounde Agreement and to allow them to benefit from a fund supplied by all the partners in the community for financing their development projects. STABEX ~~expansion~~ ~~unknown~~ set up on France's initiative by the Lome I Convention, although incomplete and imperfect on its terms of enforcement and procedures, fits in with a tradition for which the creation of a world stabilization fund for raw materials, together with an organization for production planning, even a system of price control for imports, more effective than a bank audit taking place after the fact, would be the logical conclusion.

However, one must not ignore that if this aspect of placing aid on a world basis seems beneficial for all, it would be even more so for those Third World countries whose development level is the highest and who thus would become the main beneficiaries. This is even more true when it involves the other aspect, which tends to eliminate all zones of protection or quota systems in favor of generalized preferences.

Inside the Lome Association itself, it has not been determined that the entry of the English speaking ACP ~~African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries~~, in spite of the increases of EDF ~~European Development Fund~~ allocations in current units of account, would have been economically beneficial for the former partners of the Yaounde Association, or at least for the most deprived among them. Measures of such liberal appearance as the absence of all obligation of reciprocal exemption for the admission of European products inside their frontiers, reducing the interest which certain EEC member countries could have in them, increases the latter's attraction towards the most favored countries, with whom the substance of trade is not difficult to find.

Beyond Africa and the Lome Association, it is even more certain that the tendency to put things on a world basis has had the effect, as that was opportunely pointed out during the ACP-EEC conversation in Marseille in May 1980, of hardening the ACP trading position with the common market countries, while that of the other developing countries improved, especially those in South America, Southeast Asia or the Far East. This acknowledgement that every geographic extension of assistance, whether it involves duty free admission,

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investment effort or price stability necessarily operates at the expense of the weakest, will not encourage the "privileged relations" with our African friends which Jean Pierre Cot recently declared in an interview in DAUPHINE LIBERE that he was determined to maintain. The two terms of privilege and extension are, to a certain extent, antithetical and it is perhaps the reason why the same methods were not used in the various areas of subsaharan Africa.

The 26 Countries and the Others¹

This compensation activity which formerly motivated French efforts in the creation of a Euro-African economic area should be one of the justifications for French cooperation today, by reducing the initial inequalities which the tendencies to Africanization and a world system of assistance unfortunately threaten to emphasize.

Is this the case? We observe, in fact, a reduction of investments of French bilateral assistance to African and Malagasy countries which entered before 1973 in the sphere of influence of Rue Monsieur, not only in relative value with respect to the gross national product, to total public assistance given to these countries by France and to domestic assistance to DOM-TOM, but even in real value. It is thus that the annual commitments of FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], which contributes, in the form of subsidies to economic, social and cultural investments, dropped during the same period from 610.7 to 407.7 million francs in 1976². A rapid increase of other public contributions coincides with this decline, especially loans, whose real value increased 10 times, with their share in total assistance rising from 3 to 27 percent. Those of the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation] increased from 1973 to 1978 from 487.8 to 1,242.7 million francs, corresponding to percentages of total assistance from 15.6 to 32 percent.

In all, in the period from 1970-1978, French financing of these countries increased, but the conditions for these contributions became stricter, especially because of the appearance, beginning in 1975, of

1. It involves the 26 countries with which cooperation relations are under the jurisdiction of the deputy minister to the minister of foreign relations in charge of cooperation and development, or Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Comoro Islands, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Central Africa, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Upper Volta, Djibouti, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Chad, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire.
2. However it should be noted that the trend was reversed in 1980 with FAC's total appropriations then being increased by 50 percent.

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the CCCE's second pay window, for which the conditions offered are those of the financial market. This explains why the share of total assistance supplied by France to the local economies only is preponderant in the coastal countries, which having the highest revenue and rate of growth, are better able to obtain loans. Even in the interior of the area where our cooperation is exercised, we have not managed or been able to escape the drawbacks of an assistance which is more generous for "the rich" than for "the poor".

Is that the result, as the socialist party study mentioned above suggests, of a deliberate desire to devote an increasing share of public assistance to industrial projects with which international capital is associated, with the central fund playing in this scenario the role of "pilot fish," while the enterprises which benefit from it draw back more and more before the risks of investment in favor of the less dangerous ventures of engineering and management? The truth is probably more complicated.

In fact, we see the application, in the 28 countries where our aid is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Cooperation, of 3 different systems of French assistance, unequally developed according to countries and according to period. The first is conventional cooperation: technical assistance and personnel, support of infrastructure and production operations by means of FAC subsidies. There is developing alongside this, with or without the support of insurance organizations such as COFACE [French Foreign Trade Insurance Company], an investment operation of the French private sector, at a more or less rapid rate according to the country's resources, but whose very growth leads to a reaction of partial or complete repurchase of shares by local governments. A third system is that of large investments which assumes mining or hydroelectric operations, all the more so when it involves regional projects, the essentials of which are recommended by most international credit institutions and which, involving a number of countries implies a considerable drain of capital including Arab, for which the central fund often plays, in fact--and this is the secret of the confidence it inspires abroad--the role of a front.

One can wish to change the nature of the projects retained by FAC and deplore the unsatisfactory share which agriculture, research and industrial development have there determined by use. But the rate and sectorization of investments of the private sector in Africa have only depended, at least until today, very indirectly on the state and the attitude of African governments regarding foreign capital eludes it even more. Regional projects correspond most of the time to an overall perception of needs for which the means "on the spot," however commendable they may be, are not sufficient. Such is the case with irrigation in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali in the framework of the OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization]. Western

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technology would fail in its mission if it refused to consider problems from this standpoint. Finally mining is one of the most dependable ways for African countries to escape, if not underdevelopment, at least indebtedness.

It can be imagined that the coordination of these activities in time and space is not an easy problem. FAC remains important in Upper Volta, but only plays an insignificant role in the Ivory Coast. The strictly local contributions to the capital stock of this country's industries were almost nothing in 1960. In 1978-79, they were 45 percent of it. Why be surprised that the trend is to management or engineering contracts rather than investment. The arrangement is explained all the more so, since it is imposed most often by the African countries themselves, concerned about assuring themselves or regaining the ownership of their means of production. A good example of it was supplied by the nationalization of Togolese phosphates, which certainly was not the initiative of the Togolese Mining Company of Benin. The conclusion of a technical management contract between that company and the Togolese state seemed a happy solution. In any case, it completely escapes the responsibility of the French state.

The extension of French aid to the English speaking and Portuguese speaking part of subsaharan Africa is also among the announced objectives of our new African policy.

For all that, it would be a mistake to think that there have been no French operations there during the last 10 years. While it is true that before 1970, they were limited, for the most part, to the commercial field, our enterprises, starting from that date have sought work or service contracts there and have invested there. Proof of this are the aeronautical infrastructures constructed in Kenya and Tanzania, the markets for delivery of railroad equipment and roadbed repairs in Uganda and in Mozambique and port and agricultural project studies in Somalia. The CFDT /French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers/ is now working in Mozambique served by UTA /Air Transportation Union/ and BRGM /Geological and Mining Exploration Office/ and the General Geophysical Company are prospecting there.

Finally we must not forget France's share of 21 percent in EDF operations.

The cooperation of the Quai d'Orsay, in spite of its reduced finances, has played a pioneer role in an effort marked by the missions of Messrs Guiringaud and Francois-Poncet which the successful settlement of the Djibouti affair in 1977 helped to accelerate. The encouraging guarantee given by COFACE and BFCE /French Foreign Trade Bank/ to exported capital in the countries which have signed an agreement protecting investments with France, besides, only goes back to 1973 and the guarantee system in its present form only to 1976.

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On the other hand, we can say that the financial arrangements used to encourage this movement are affected by the especially commercial nature of France's initial activities in eastern and southern Africa. The mixture of private credits guaranteed for export and complementary treasury loans, linked with a rate of interest based on the percentage of public contribution, is poorly adapted to new activities such as the large labor markets, industrial investments and even less to rural development operations, not involving the rapid creation of new resources. The so-called periods of lack of assets, during which the burden of the loans still does not weigh on the treasuries, should be scheduled differently for such projects. Those of 5 to 6 years which the central fund observes are obviously much more suitable for them. This is one of the reasons why operations of this organization outside of its regular field would be beneficial.

New Organization?

There has been mentioned in administrative and political circles the creation of "a cooperation agency" about which few details are available, but which could be based on a better involvement of all the country, namely organizations, trade unions and African development enterprises. The attitude of the trade unions is basically hostile, in France as in Germany, to foreign investments, but increasing their representation in the planning or decision branches of the agency could make the workers better informed and thus contribute to softening too rigid positions. The presence of enterprises in the same branches would involve, on their part, a more sustained interest in Africa, but could also be expressed, if one was not careful, by a risk of commercialization of aid.

However, minor changes are involved there, the real problem being the methods and means which we have available to meet the needs which are appearing in Africa and the opportunity which would appear, on the basis of the situation, to unify the organizations in charge of French operations in various areas, as well as their financial methods.

Regarding the "twenty-six," one fact is obvious, first of all: agreements have been concluded with them which it certainly is not a question of terminating unilaterally, their execution assuming, on the other hand, services which cannot be disrupted overnight. Likewise it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the ministry of cooperation extends to the political field, based on the principle that the leaders of the countries whose relations with France are generally long standing must find a place in Paris where they feel comfortable and they find the facts they need to know grouped together, without having to seek them in other ministries. The employment in this place of personnel who are knowledgeable because of their

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previous careers about African problems (but unfortunately smaller from year to year) thus expedites these contacts, following that maxim dear to the lamented professor Robert Montagne that "it is not bad to sometimes know what you are talking about."

Such an acquisition must be preserved, which does not imply at all that the reorganization of activities directed from Rue Monsieur, Quai d'Orsay or Quai Branly is impossible to achieve. The union of the Ministry of Cooperation with that of Foreign Relations should facilitate it. We have observed, as we went along that the aid provided by Rue Monsieur had hardened somewhat in recent years, moreover, there had been a reaction against it in 1980, but it reflected also the need to solve the new problems in the cooperation sector. On the contrary, outside cooperation, the business transacted, will depend almost as often henceforth on aid for development as on French commercial or industrial expansion. There are points of convergence there which deserve to be studied more carefully.

Moreover, they could be strengthened by nationalization of credit, which raises many still unanswered questions, but whose unpardonable effect, if not always beneficial, would obviously be to encourage the influence of public authorities on the policies of the private sector in Africa.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RESERVATIONS STILL PREVAIL ABOUT ECOWAS DEFENSE PACT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1971, 15 Jul 81 p 35

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "A Defense Pact Against Whom?"]

[Text] Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde still have not signed the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community] defense pact and a number of reactions to this were observed during the OAU summit in Nairobi. These three powers were reproached for not wanting to play the game of solidarity or for giving in to outside pressures, without being concerned about the spirit and the goals themselves of the defense pact.

Even lately, Niger also appeared reluctant, out of fear of displeasing its northern neighbor, Libya. But the Chad affair has made it a supporter of the pact and its signature, the last one received, raised to 12 the number of West African member countries.

Regarding Mali, it was especially reproached for sharing the reservations of its northern neighbor, Algeria. But Alioune Blondin Beye, Malian minister of foreign affairs, who represented President Moussa Traore at the summit in Nairobi, categorically denied this assertion: "Algeria, whose good neighbor spirit we praise, has never exerted the least pressure on us. Our reservations are based elsewhere and we have told all our partners in CEDEAO that we are ready to sign the defense pact as soon as all of these countries will have cancelled the bilateral agreements which link them with powers outside Africa. On our part, we do not want to be linked with the western powers nor with those of the East."

Moreover, Alioune Blondin Beye admits that his reservations are somewhat "maximalist" and that some African countries will not easily renounce pacts and defense treaties signed, especially with France. The sharp difference which may appear between the new president Francois Mitterrand and his predecessor has not reduced Malian reservations.

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As for Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, their vacillation is for other reasons. They do not demand the dismantling of the military bases of the powers outside of Africa--those of France especially--, but they demand that the countries where these bases are located give up participating in joint maneuvers. The latter which were frequent in 1980 and 1981 (in Togo, the Ivory Coast and Zaire, in particular) appear to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde as contrary to the universal spirit of the CEDEAO agreements.

However, it can be expected that the two Portuguese speaking countries of the community will soon soften their position and will join the pact. In Nairobi their contacts have been numerous with the so-called "moderate" countries: one has observed, for example, the contacts made by the president of Guinea-Bissau, Nino Viera, with Messrs Ahmadou Ahijdo (Cameroon) and Abdou Diouf (Senegal) before, during and after the summit...The fact that they made the trip and the stay together indicates that.

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CAMEROON

BACKGROUND PROVIDED ON 16 MAY INCIDENT WITH NIGERIA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1071, 15 Jul 81 pp 40-41

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "War?"]

[Text] There is a saying that gratitude in politics is nonexistent. Cameroon is confirming this sad truth today at its expense. Sharing as it does a 1,600-kilometer border with Nigeria, Cameroon could easily have aided the attempted breakup of its powerful neighbor--if nothing else, by serving as a rear area for the Biafra rebels. During the civil war that spelled the end of Biafra (1967-1970), President Ahmadou Ahidjo was approached from all sides to recognize the secessionist state. General de Gaulle himself did everything possible to wring this decision from him. But, loyal to the principles of the OAU establishing the inviolability of the borders inherited from the colonial system, the Cameroonian chief of state firmly and courageously refused that recognition.

For all that, it is the same Nigeria which today, having recovered its unity and its power, threatens Cameroon. And all because of a border incident--particularly bloody, it is true--that occurred on 16 May in Rio del Rey, that is, entirely within Cameroonian territory. (JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 1065).

Returning that day from a visit to an oil exploitation platform operated by the French company ELF [Oil Exploration and Exploitation Enterprise] and situated inside Cameroonian territorial waters, some Cameroonian coastguardsmen rammed their vessel into that of their Nigerian counterparts. Subsequently, both sides claimed that the first shots fired had come from the opposing vessel. The degree of culpability of one side and the other is undoubtedly difficult to establish. On the other hand, the outcome is common knowledge: Seven Nigerian coastguardsmen killed, no Cameroonian losses. Unquestionably, it was a severe outcome. But border incidents between the two countries are common occurrences. In January, during an official visit by the Nigerian chief of state, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, to Cameroon, the chief of the Cameroonian district of Idabato and eight members of his staff were kidnapped in their own territory, taken to the other side of the border, and illegally confined. The nine men were not released until a week later, after a number of protests by the Cameroonian authorities.

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Customarily, incidents of such nature have always ended up being settled amicably, in a spirit of good-neighborliness, without any third party having intervened. But this time, the Nigerian colossus, breathing fire and fury, thundered and threatened its neighbor. The very next day following the clash, Lagos lost no time in raising the stakes. After displaying the corpses of the Nigerian victims on television, using skillful staging clearly designed to arouse the emotions and anger of his compatriots, Prince Ishaya Audu, minister of external affairs, without beating about the bush, demanded "unconditional apologies within the week, punishment of the murderers, and full indemnization of the families of the victims."

Taking over, the Nigerian senators began immediately vying for center stage with chauvinistic, hate-filled speeches, shouting for vengeance. Next, the Lagos press and that of the chief towns of the provinces went hammer and tongs at Cameroon, labeling it an "arrogant whelp" who should be dealt a "swift and exemplary punishment." Mere verbal escalation? Perhaps. But on the Cameroonian side of the border, the authorities have taken the matter very seriously. The more so since the Nigerian government is making no secret of its intention to launch a punitive expedition. The signs pointing in that direction are multiplying and taking clearer shape.

In recent days, an unaccustomed concentration of MIG's belonging to the Nigerian Federal Armed Forces has been observed at the Calabar airport, near the border. Nigerian military planes are overflying Cameroonian territory periodically, while warships patrol Cameroon's territorial waters constantly. Around the beginning of June, one of the latter did not hesitate to sink a fishing vessel as it was leaving the port of Douala. A superlative miscarriage of intent: It was... a Nigerian vessel! In a more serious development, around the end of May, Foreign Minister Ishaya Audu summoned the French charge d'affaires in Lagos to inform him that his country was about to "chastise" Cameroon, and that if France becomes involved, all her assets in Nigeria (which are not in the least negligible) will be immediately frozen...

The giant's bellicose fury was such that a number of chiefs of state of the region were unable to placate it. Seizing the opportunity of the ECOWAS summit around the end of May in Freetown (Sierra Leone), Sekou Toure of Guinea was the first to offer his good offices. Only to receive a severe dressing down from his Nigerian counterpart, Shehu Shagari. Then, Presidents Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone (presiding officer of the OAU at the time), Abdou Diouf (Senegal) and Seyni Kountche (Niger) followed each other to Lagos in the hope of arranging a peaceful settlement. For their part, Presidents Gnassingbe Eyadema (Togo) and Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) sent ministerial delegations to Lagos to propose to Alhaji Shehu Shagari that he meet with his Cameroonian counterpart in Lome or in Yamoussoukro for the purpose of burying the war hatchet.

Although President Ahmadou Ahidjo, who hastened to express his regrets and to offer his condolences following the 16 May incident, says he is prepared to meet with his irascible neighbor anywhere and at any time, the latter has invariably rejected until now any suggestion of a meeting and, a fortiori, of a reconciliation. At Lagos, it is murmured by some that the chief of state absented himself

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from the 18th OAU summit in Nairobi not only for reasons of his displeasure with the OAU Secretariat as claimed, but simply so as not to have to shake hands with President Ahidjo. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand the skepticism surrounding the creation in Nairobi of the ad hoc committee (another one!) to settle the Nigerian-Cameroonian dispute.

The truth is that this strange quarrel exudes a strong smell of oil. Nigeria has in fact sought from the very beginning to obtain a modification of the border that would enable it to take over in its entirety the oil-rich basin that now straddles it between the two countries. Invariably and successively, since Nigeria's independence in 1961, each chief of state who has come to power in Lagos, finding it difficult to formulate this desire openly as a claim, has taken it up privately with President Ahidjo. The Cameroonian chief of state has been willing to accept some minor changes, but has steadfastly refused to yield to the excessive gluttony of his powerful neighbor.

Whereas his predecessors had all more or less reconciled themselves to the Cameroonian refusal, Shehu Shagari for his part appears intent upon taking advantage of the unfortunate incident of 16 May, even if it means unfurling the banner of war--the more so, since he hopes to use it to advantage to consolidate his political position, which has been deeply shaken by domestic setbacks whose turbulence has been as upsetting as their number. But is the Nigerian chief of state, in thus embarking on such a dangerous course, not in fact playing into the hands of his enemies? The fear of this is strong among his followers--even though they dare not openly admit it.

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

ARMS FROM FRANCE--Cameroon has procured an urgent supply of arms from France as a consequence of the border incidents with Nigeria on 16 May. To speed up delivery, Paris has ordered shipments to be made from French Army stocks in Douala (Cameroon), Libreville (Gabon) and Port Bouet (Ivory Coast). The negotiations were conducted in France by the secretary general of the Cameroonian Ministry of Defense. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1071, 15 Jul 81 p 28]
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1071, 15 Jul 81 p 39

[Interview with Prime Minister Simon Narcisse Bozanga by Francois Soudan; date and place not given]

[Text] As a 39-year-old prime minister, Simon Narcisse Bozanga is one of those loyal followers who make excellent heirs apparent. Head of the Central African Government since 3 April 1981, David Dacko's right arm was in Paris in early July--to "apprise" the new French Government, no doubt, but also to find out about the socialist leaders' intentions regarding the Central African Republic.

Incisive and readily caustic, this man, who was secretary general of the government in the last years of Bokassa's reign, expresses his views. We will get back to the "inside story" of his Paris visit in a later issue

JEUNE AFRIQUE: You have sharply criticized former President Giscard d'Estaing's "very humiliating" attitude toward the Central African Republic (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1070). Why did you wait until he was no longer in office to speak out?

Simon Bozanga: Why do you ridicule what I have said? It is very simple: we could not speak out before! The nature and extent of the pressures which the Giscard government exerted on us were such that it was impossible for us to do so.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What pressures?

Simon Bozanga: I will give you two examples. Upon returning to power (in September 1979), David Dacko wanted diamond production to get underway again on the basis of small operations that would be assigned to national companies. We met with the flat opposition of Paris, which wanted to establish large operations, run by French companies, of course. We met with the same refusal concerning our Bakouma uranium deposits: for various reasons, France always refused to develop them. It felt that they were not necessary for its needs and prevented us from seeking aid elsewhere. Giscard always looked down on us.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: You have met with new representatives in Paris. What have they told you?

Simon Bozanga: I have seen some objective, unprejudiced men. They acknowledged the legitimacy of the elected government in the Central African Republic. Above all,

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they said that they would refrain from meddling in our internal affairs. I believe that the new French leaders are realistic men.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: One last item: Bokassa. Have you really requested his extradition from the Ivory Coast?

Simon Bozanga: How can you doubt it? We want Bokassa! Last year, I myself wanted to go to Abidjan to discuss the matter directly. I was told that my visit would not be advisable. Now it is up to the Ivorians to decide. But our patience is limited.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FPO-PT LEADER DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073, 29 Jul 81 p 26

[Interview with Abel Goumba by Francois Soudan, in Paris, date not specified]

[Text] The main leader of the Ubangi Patriotic Front (FPO) since its founding in 1976, Abel Goumba, 53, a doctor, is one of the "historic" figures in Central African nationalism: he was in fact the right-hand man of the "founder of the republic," Barthelemy Boganda. Among the very few politicians not to have been compromised with Bokassa, he believes in "nationalistic socialism"

Since 18 July, he is one of the individuals most sought after by David Dacko's police. We met him in Paris.

[Question] President David Dacko stated that you were on the point of unleashing an urban guerrilla action. Is it true?

[Answer] That is grotesque. We have always condemned violence and terrorism. But the president panicked in the face of our growing influence. So he just invented something.

[Question] If we look at your tally in the presidential elections of March 1981 (1.4 percent), you do not seem to be representing much.

[Answer] These elections were fraudulent. I myself was unable to vote. The FPO is the most feared of the parties, because it is the best structured.

[Question] What ties do you have with the instigator of the 14 July attack, Idi Lalla?

[Answer] Idi Lalla was excluded from our party a year ago. He is irresponsible, he kept ties with Qadhdhafi while maintaining secret relations with Dacko. We think, moreover, that this criminal act is a provocation.

[Question] With what aim?

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[Answer] To muzzle the opposition which was beginning to obstruct him and in order to drag the country into civil war. The objective of the government is to force French troops to intervene massively on his side.

[Question] Are you asking for the departure of the Barracuda contingent?

[Answer] Not at all. We simply hope that its mission will be modified: it should train the Central African army, instead of serving as a support for Dacko.

[Question] There is an arrest warrant out for you, and your party is banned. What are you going to do?

[Answer] We have overthrown Bokassa, we are not going to be afraid of Dacko. We are accustomed to clandestine struggle. As for me, if I am turned over [to CAR authorities], while they still refuse to extradite Bokassa, that would be the limit!

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

EXPERIMENT IN MULTI-PARTIES SHATTERS INTO PIECES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073, 29 Jul 81 p 26

[Article by Francois Soudan--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] A terrorist attack for which an adventurer claimed responsibility was enough to destroy the timid experiment in multi-party politics.

There was a country in the center of Africa where there was a kind of multiparty system, where elections had just been held without too much fraud, where human rights were not systematically violated. But when a bomb exploded on 14 July in a movie-house in the capital, it was enough to extinguish in an instant the timid breeze of liberty that had been blowing in Central Africa. Since 18 July, in fact, by decree of President Dacko, the two principal opposition parties--Ange Patasse's Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC) and Abel Goumba's Ubangi Patriotic Front (FPO)--have been shut down--one of them suspended, the other banned and its leaders hunted.

However, all of Central Africa's opposition groups, including the MLPC and the FPO, had unequivocally condemned the attack on the Club cinema--which left three dead and 32 wounded--and disavowed its clandestine instigator, Rodolphe Idi Lalla. "Ze"--Idi Lalla's nickname--is regarded as a leper by political types in Bangui, particularly by Abel Goumba, who was his spokesman until his expulsion from the FPO in July 1980. An internal document of the Front describes him, in fact, as a /"notorious tribalist"/ and a /"political nobody."/ A convert to Islam not too long ago, Idi Lalla travels a great deal between Brazzaville, Lagos, and Bissau, but it was in Tripoli that the general headquarters of his party, the Central African National Liberation Movement, were established. "Ze" was able, without too many problems, to recruit the several dozen men of his "armed forces" from among the 350 Central African soldiers trained in Libya during the Bokassa reign who have not yet been repatriated (about a hundred of them have been integrated into Col Qadhdhafi's Islamic Legion). Idi Lalla's objective: the departure of the 1,300 French paratroopers and Dacko's overthrow. The means: armed struggle.

If the banning of "Ze's" movement seems understandable, the measures taken against the legally constituted parties, such as the FPO and the MLPC which condemned the 14 July attack, seem disturbing. Especially since the evidence used against them--which they have refuted--dates from October 1979: at that time several arrested militants were supposedly found to have "urban guerrilla plans."

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Central Africa is still, in a very broad way, a fragile entity, and David Dacko has taken a considerable risk in excluding from political life two groups which at the time of the presidential elections of March 1981 had amassed close to 40 percent of the votes. The risk has a name: "Chadization," fragmentation. Moreover, by accusing neighboring Congo of complicity, because it shelters a number of FPO activists, the Bangui authorities are going to complicate somewhat their relations with a state through which a sizable portion of their exports transit.

Finally, one can foresee the chance of increased strains with socialist France; the few encouraging words which Prime Minister Simon Bozanga had--laboriously--succeeded in obtaining during his trip to Paris at the beginning of July (see J.A. No 1072) might well go out the window: /"The Dacko regime is becoming less presentable,"/ confides one high official in the Elysee. /"It felt itself overwhelmed by the opposition, it panicked; a pity."/ Doubtless. Even if for the moment the green barracudas from Bouar are not likely to be flown in.

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CHAD

GOUKOUNI VIEWED AS CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073, 29 Jul 81 p 25

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] With the 13 July ministerial shake-up of his government, President Goukouni Oueddei proved that he is now in control of the situation. Since the expulsion of Hissein Habre, the ministerial team had not been changed. Moreover, it was 7 months before the former defense minister was divested of his functions. His "rebellion" against the government began, in fact, in February 1980. Now it was only in September of that year the President Goukouni dismissed the leader of FAN [Northern Armed Forces] and his main collaborators.

After getting strong support from the 18th summit of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] (Nairobi, 24-28 June), the president could no longer afford to be satisfied with a provisional government. The GUNT [Transitional National Union Government], born out of the Lagos accords (August 1979), is now consigned to history. And what might still be called "the Habre faction" is totally absent from the new structure.

The head of the GUNT is first of all consolidating his power. This is why the ministry of defense (Hissein Habre's ministry) is going to one of his faithful followers. Maj Adoum Togoi is not a professionally trained soldier. He is a combatant who has had experience in the field and who commands Goukouni Oueddei's FAP [Peoples Armed Forces]. His nomination must be seen in the context of the creation of a national integrated army over which the chief of state would ultimately like to have control. This concern for security and power explains the continuance of Alhadji Mahamat Abba Said in the ministry of interior. The head of the fundamentalist FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front], he has become a bitter enemy of Acyl Ahmat, who however retains the foreign affairs portfolio. The foreign minister, whose pro-Libyan sympathies are well known, will not therefore have much freedom to maneuver within the government. Especially since the two men hold the rank of minister of state.

Acyl Ahmat, however, enjoys an additional advantage, compared to Abba Said. It is his movement which, thanks to Libyan aid, has the biggest stockpile of arms. But this advantage is counterbalanced by the military and intellectual cadres, of whom the "southerners" are the best equipped in the country. The retention of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue as vice president seems to illustrate this situation.

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Although the ministerial shake-up took place in his absence (he was still on the payroll in Paris), some of his enemies believe that it must have been a surprise.

Other ministers of state: Lossiman Naimbaye in rural development, and Ngangbet Kosnaye in economy and finance, the position previously occupied by Mahamat Saleh Ahmat, the former right-hand man of Hissein Habre who deserted the FAN in April. Everything transpires, moreover, as if the former defense minister's principal lieutenants had decided to abandon him. The latest resignation is that of Abderahman Hamdane, who was executive secretary of the FAN.

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

QADHDHAFI'S OFFER--Comoro President Ahmed Abdallah refused an offer from Qadhdhafi of 35 million dollars in return for the establishment of a Libyan airbase at Moroni. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 31 Jul 81 p 89] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.]

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION--The first ordinary session of the 1981 Malagasy National Assembly ended on 4 July, with a brief speech by President Lucien-Xavier-Michel Andrianarahinjaka. This session, which the daily newspaper MADAGASCAR-MATIN described as historic, was characterized principally by forthright reports by each of the members of government, who answered questions from the deputies, in what was called the "great explanation." We have presented the main points of the Assembly's deliberations as they concerned the economic sector. Among the causes of the present difficulties of Madagascar, according to the president of the National Popular Assembly, the insufficiency of finances, men and means has often been advanced; however, he added, we must also know how "to manage what we have." The matter of greatest urgency at present is to do a good job of conducting the "production battle." In addition to these ministerial reports, it is to be noted that the National Popular Assembly session permitted approval of legislation dealing with the status of the national police, research personnel and professors of higher education, loans to be obtained for new projects and the tax on hydrocarbons. The National Popular Assembly also ratified economic, technical and scientific agreements with socialist countries, including Iraq and Cuba. Draft legislation was also approved for a loan of \$10 million from OPEC and for bilateral relations between the Democratic Republic of Madagascar and Libya. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS In French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 p 1827] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8143

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MAURITIUS

BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE--Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of cooperation, will travel to Mauritius next December on an official visit, during a tour of the Indian Ocean, according to an announcement made on 7 July by the Mauritian prime minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, upon his return from Paris. Questioned by newsmen upon his arrival at the Plaisance airport, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam said that during his talk in the French capital with President Francois Mitterrand, the latter listened attentively to the account of Mauritian problems. According to Sir Seewoosagur, the subjects taken up on that occasion in particular were the problem of technical and financial assistance to Mauritius, entry and departure visas for Mauritians in France, the recovery of the Mauritian fishing industry and the sending of a contingent of Mauritian workers to France. The prime minister, who was also received by his French counterpart, Pierre Mauroy; Cot; and Claude Cheysson, minister of foreign affairs, concluded by saying that there was no doubt that relations between Mauritius and France will be strengthened. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 p 1897] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8143

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REUNION

COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 p 1901

[Text] The Public Information Institute of the Overseas Departments in its last situation report, described the economic and monetary posture of Reunion.

The 1980 sugar season ended in December. Sugar production totaled 228,076 tons compared to 260,748 tons for the previous season; i.e., a decrease of 13 percent. The average industrial yield of the sugar mills was lower than that of 1979: 10.66 percent instead of 10.84 percent. Although the price of a reference ton of sugarcane with a 13.8 percent richness of sugar was raised to 158.02 francs (plus 15 percent), the effective average price was slightly lower than the reference price; and the growers were granted a special compensation allowance, an allowance which was coupled with the customary social aid, according to the size of the contributions. The FOB price of a quintal of 98 percent pure sugar was set at 263.53 francs, compared to 231.79 francs in 1979. A plan for the consolidation of the sugar economy will be implemented to bring about more extensive mechanization of cultivation and to reach a profitability threshold of 75 tons per hectare (57 tons in 1980).

In 1980, production of traditional industrial rum and light rum totaled 65,865 hectoliters of pure alcohol (plus 26 percent); and exports totaled 47,450 hectoliters (plus 26 percent), including 40,572 hectoliters to Metropolitan France. Production of molasses alcohol totaled 5,350 hectoliters of pure alcohol, compared to 9,560 hectoliters in 1979.

In January 1980, the geranium plantations were seriously damaged by the passage of hurricane Hyacinth; and the production of geranium oil totaled only 40 tons (minus 48 percent compared to 1979). In spite of its quality, "Bourbon" geranium oil must face up to very lively competition on the part of producers such as Egypt, China and Morocco, which are charging much lower prices; the Reunion price has been maintained at 395 francs per kilo FOB. The production of essence of vetivar totaled 22 tons (minus 12 percent) and exports amounted to 14 tons (minus 42 percent); commercialization was more difficult because of the competition of other producers countries (Haiti, Java). The Reunion price has been maintained at 475 francs per kilo FOB.

The production of essence of green vanilla experienced an appreciable drop compared to 1979, 69 tons (minus 27 percent); exports of prepared vanilla totaled only 10 tons

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(minus 56 percent) but at much higher prices (an average of 450 francs per kilo FOB). Exports were made to metropolitan France (74 percent) and the FRG (10 percent), with the balance to the United States, Great Britain and Australia. At the beginning of 1981, the price to the producer of green vanilla was raised from 30 to 50 francs per kilo.

In 1980, the consumption of meat in the department decreased 21 percent compared to 1979, and imports were reduced 27 percent. Production in the fishing sector totaled 851 tons (minus 18 percent). A new enterprise was established in 1980 (the Southern Seas Shipping Company). The experimental raising of marine turtles produced its first slaughtering activities in December 1980, and its normal rate of 16 tons per month was attained in November 1981.

Within the context of incentive measures for development and industrialization in the Overseas Departments, 14 investment projects in 1980 were accorded an equipment premium (including industrial bakeries, biscuit manufacture, production of pre-fabricated materials for construction, industrial woodwork, metal scaffolding, plastic pipes, the establishment of a fish shipping company through the acquisition of a trawler, an electric production unit which uses bagasse).

In 1980, Reunion was visited by about 60,000 tourists, half of whom were Reunioneese living abroad. At the end of December, the department's accommodation capacity was 701 rooms, compared to 666 at the end of 1979.

Among the public works, the highway program was continued; the modernization of the Gillot airport was completed; as was the programmed hydro-agricultural project; the equipping of schools and the modernizing of hospitals are underway.

As of 31 December 1980, unfilled situations wanted totaled 30,953 (plus 20 percent over the end of 1979).

Developments in Reunion's commercial exchanges sector are reflected in the following table (in millions of francs):

	1979	1980
Imports	-3,305	3,921.5
Exports	594.1	553.1
Deficit	-2,710.9	-3,368.4

During 1980, Reunion's monetary evolution was characterized by a 15 percent increase in the monetary mass, an appreciable slowdown in the growth of foreign holdings (plus 8 percent instead of plus 21 percent) and by a sharp increase in credits over monetary resources (plus 25 percent).

As of 31 December 1980, bills and specie in circulation totaled 1.3 billion francs (plus 22 percent). Sight deposits in the banking system totaled 1.5 billion francs (plus 5.5 percent over the end of 1979) and term accounts also totaled 1.5 billion francs (plus 19.4 percent). In comparison, the total of credits to the economy

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amounted to 3.3 billion francs at the end of 1980 (pous 21.6 percent), with the following principal sectors benefiting therefrom: production-export, imports, housing construction and the hotel business.

For 1981, the general section of FIDOM [Overseas Departments Investment Fund] was granted a specific allocation of 10.8 million francs for Reunion (irrigation programs, sugar industry modernization and miscellaneous projects). The departmental section was also granted 34.8 million francs in credits.

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SENEGAL

FRENCH REPORTER NOTES RESULTS OF DIOUF'S SIX MONTHS IN POWER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1071, 15 Jul 81 pp 46-48

[Article by Claude Wauthier]

[Text] Looking forward to the "civilization of the sun," the fight against corruption has been launched. The "civilization of the sun": a pretty phrase, one that will likely delight ecologists, especially in Africa. Although the Senegalese prime minister, Mr Habib Thiam, probably did not coin it, he has nevertheless adopted it as his own with conviction and with enthusiasm, if such a simple analogy may be made.

Confidence

The reference is to solar energy, of course, the energy source which Third World countries lack the least and which seems, to all countries devoid of black gold, to be a miraculous weapon that will enable them, one day, to reduce their ruinous oil bills. In Senegal, this oil bill will eat up 50 percent of export revenues this year. Thus what could be more fascinating than to imagine solar power stations that will produce the electricity needed for factories and sprawling cities and, in each village, solar engines that will operate the pumps of irrigation canals.

But the Senegalese prime minister refers to these radiant prospects with a clear head: the "civilization of the sun" will undoubtedly require years to emerge. Of course, an initial experimental solar power plant is being tested at Diakha, but with the current state of the technology, the investment required for a solar power plant is 10 times greater than that needed for a thermal power plant using coal and fuel oil. An important qualifying factor: sunshine is free.

As for village solar engines, they must be perfected and installed before producing that wonderful rural electrification--of which the first soviets dreamed--that will make real economic decentralization possible, Habib Thiam pointed out.

The Senegalese Government is obviously not relying on solar energy to solve the urgent problems caused by an almost tragic economic situation: the endemic drought that has ravaged the countries of the Sahel, a peanut harvest which dropped last year to less than 200,000 tons (as opposed to more than 1 million tons about 10 years ago), foreign trade with a huge deficit and considerable foreign indebtedness. Nor should the consequences of abusive bureaucratization be overlooked (which was

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dealt a serious blow, however, by the dissolution of the National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development--ONCAD--last year) and the harmful influence of corruption which has been sharply denounced in the Senegalese press, one of the freest in Africa, delighting the heart of every journalist despite its excesses.

As a result of substantial contributions from financial backers, Arab and French in particular (Senegal inspires confidence), several major projects will soon be completed: the first dam on the Senegal River, the Diama, for irrigation and the plant of Chemical Industries of Senegal (which will produce fertilizer from Taiba phosphates).

Luck

To reduce the oil bill--in addition to solar electricity and electric power produced by the dams planned at Manantali on the Senegal River and at Kekreti on the Gambia River--the government plans to exploit deposits of lignite and of peat in particular, which have recently been discovered in the north. And then with luck, to exploit Senegalese black gold itself: for oil has been discovered in Casamance--heavy-oil reserves estimated at 100 million tons, but contained in bituminous shale that is difficult to exploit, and a pocket of light oil in Dome-Flore, which should provide 250,000 tons a year for 5 years. Finally, in the case of wind energy and biomass, various projects are under study, in particular one for eucalyptus plantations. This plan for gradual reduction of the oil bill will probably be staggered over 10 years and cost 75 billion CFA francs--according to the RENES (Energy Redeployment of Senegal) Report, which has just been submitted by the minister of development.

But all of these projects--and those to promote truck farming (100,000 tons of exported vegetables are worth as much as 1 million tons of peanuts, Mr Thiam points out), fishing (400,000 tons of fish were caught last year) and tourism (now tied for first place with phosphates for bringing in foreign exchange)--may well founder or benefit only a minority, even large foreign companies. According to LE POLITICIEN, Mam Less Dia's caustic weekly, Senegalese industry and trade, as much as 70 percent in some sectors, are in the hands of large companies, particularly French companies, far ahead of the Senegalese and Lebanese--who are nevertheless accused by Marxists of having replaced the national middle class. And then, according to other Senegalese newspapers, corruption is rampant at all levels.

Prestige

Whatever the case, the government's reaction has been swift. It adopted two anti-corruption bills in early June, the first establishing a new offense, "illicit enrichment," and the second establishing a new court to judge it. The new crime will be committed when someone is unable to justify resources enabling him to lead a life-style not in keeping with his declared income. Ministers, deputies and civil servants will be subject to the new law and the accomplices of those guilty of fraud and who disclose the facts about the corruption will be exempted from prosecution. These two bills are evidence of the determination of the president and his administration. Thus if he believes that he can upset the nests of those who are amateurs at graft, it is because he is definitely enjoying--at least for the time being--that presidential "state of grace" reserved for new chiefs of state, in the manner of Ronald Reagan and Francois Mitterrand.

Since becoming chief executive, President Diouf has scored several victories: his noted presence at the latest Islamic summit of Taif, the way in which he absolved Senegal from any responsibility in the recent abortive coup d'etat in Mauritania and the series of visits which he has paid to several African chiefs of state has assured him the prestige which he might have lacked, inasmuch as he was not elected but appointed by former President Senghor as his successor. Thus confident of this prestige, he has also authorized the existence of all political parties and has dispensed with early elections which would have probably legitimized his presidency, since they seemed won in advance.

For the only opposition party represented in the National Assembly, Abdoulaye Wade's PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party), is running out of steam (4 of its 18 deputies have rejoined the majority) and none of the other nongovernmental groups seems to be able to threaten the dominance of the PS [Socialist Party] in the immediate future, so much so that most of the opposition leaders, from Sheik Anta Diop's RND (Democratic National Rally) to Majhmout Diop's PAI (African Independence Party), and Abdoulaye Wade himself, are hardly insistent about requesting that the date of the elections planned for 1983 be advanced. Another sign of the confidence in the president and his administration: the renewal of the "solidarity tax" in June for 1 year: 1 day's wages per month from all wage earners. This measure has not caused any public outcry.

This is because the Senegalese are well aware that this tax has enabled the government to withstand the pressures of the International Monetary Fund, which established as a condition for providing assistance the elimination of the subsidies making it possible to maintain the reduced retail price of staple commodities, mainly rice.

Abdou Diouf pointed out to IMF experts that it was precisely such measures which led to a coup d'etat in Liberia last year and he rejected their demands. In this half-won test of strength, since the IMF has still granted him a standby credit while hoping for more concessions, Senegal is relying on France not to abandon it to deal with those formidable international experts who are infatuated with "monetarism" and "truth in pricing."

The rise to power of the French PS, with which the Senegalese PS has long been linked within the Socialist Internationale, is a good sign in this regard, as though the friendship between Paris and Dakar were getting off to a new start.

But with a certain continuity, however: for example, for the time being there is no question of requesting the withdrawal of the French garrison, which the Senegalese Government views as a guarantee against aggressive expansionism--such as that of Colonel Qadhafi--at least as long as the inter-African force stipulated by the ECOWAS defense pact is not set up.

Shield

In this connection, it should be noted that Majhmout Diop, a Marxist, in turn feels that this same French garrison--whose withdrawal he probably desired when Giscard d'Estaing was in power, since in his opinion France was then the policeman for the United States in Africa--is welcome today as a shield against "American imperialism."

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That is undoubtedly an extreme example of a convergence of views--for contradictory reasons--between the government and the opposition, as is the consensus for keeping the date scheduled for the 1983 elections: the opposition parties, which are abundant, believe that they need time to organize or to regroup, whereas the PS is counting on them to split or to rally to its support.

Until then--and the "civilization of the sun"--Senegal is praying, including all sects, members of the Muridiya and Tidjaniya, as well as Christians and animists, for the summer rains to finally be abundant this year, heralding fat cattle and providing indisputable proof that President Abdou Diouf is indeed "blessed."

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SENEGAL

REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES PROLIFERATE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073, 29 Jul 81 p 27

[Article by Momar Kebe Ndiaye--passage enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Since President Abdou Diouf rescinded the restrictions on party pluralism, no fewer than six organizations have been recognized.

The /"unrestricted party pluralism"/ instituted on 24 April is getting out of hand. In less than 2 weeks, five new parties have been officially recognized. This brings to 10 the number of organizations legally entered into the political arena since 19 June (J.A. No 1069).

On Tuesday 7 July, therefore, the MRDN and MDP became legal. The former, the Revolutionary Movement for New Democracy of the Ande Jef (Union for Labor) group, has a Maoist program oriented toward the working class. The second, the Democratic Peoples Movement, stands for self-managed socialism. It is led by former council president Mamadou Dia.

On Thursday 9 July, it was the turn of the Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party (LD-MPT) of Marxist-Leninist coloring. Headed by Babacar Sane, a teacher, it includes the leaders of SUDES [Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers], among them its secretary general, Mamadou Ndoeye. The main teachers' trade union, SUDES is deemed to be increasing in influence. At the "States General of Education" held at the end of January in Dakar, the purpose of which was to define new guidelines for schooling, President Abdou Diouf made overtures to the opposition trade union.

Teachers

On 10 July was recognized the "clandestine" group formerly known as the PAI, which has now become the Independence and Labor Party (PIT), also Marxist-Leninist, but closer to the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). A dissident faction of the African Independence Party (PAI) of Majhmout Diop, it is headed by three teachers, Amath Dansokho, Maguette Thiam, and Samba Dioulde Thiam. The latter two, in collaboration with Mamadou Dia, have for several years published the opposition monthly ANDE SOPI ("Union for Change.") Following a schism in the MRDN (pro-Maoist), the dissident faction-- which is considered pro-Albanian--regrouped as the Union for Peoples Democracy (UDP, Marxist) and was recognized on 20 July.

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It is not finished yet. Other small groups claiming allegiance to various ideologies, Trotskyites among them, are knocking at the door of the interior ministry to get their papers.

Proliferation

In any case, President Abdou Diouf, who promised to go all the way with the democratic experiment, no longer seems to be in a position to back out. The five newly recognized organizations (all Marxist-Leninist, with the exception of Mamadou Dia's MDP) intend to position themselves to the left of the Socialist Party (PS) in power, and even to the left of the Democratic National Rally (RND), while the nationalist party of Cheikh Anta Diop (recognized on 19 June), a potential rival of the PS and a serious rival of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of Abdoulaye Wade, is presently losing momentum.

In the midst of this democratic proliferation, it is nevertheless difficult to assess the real representativeness of these various factions. And for that we will doubtless have to await the moment of truth: the presidential and legislative elections of February 1983.

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